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Copyright, and indeed all intellectual property, reflects a compromise between the need for 
reward  on  creations  we  see  –  by  reserving  them  to  the  creator  –  and  the  need  to  let 
information freely flow so as to permit further creations to emerge with as few encumbrances 
as possible. Over the past quarter century or so, all parameters of copyright have been moved 
towards  more  protection,  disturbing  the  underlying  compromise.  The  term  of  protection 
extends well beyond what is practically useful for the vast majority of creators, much as it 
may serve the needs of a small number of large players who hold important older copyrights 
still producing revenue. This  paradoxical  situation results  from  a few  founding principles 
considered untouchable in the countries members of the Berne Convention: it is automatically 
obtained, without formality and for a uniform and rather lengthy term. If we want to redress 
the balance underlying copyright, we may have to call these principles into question and lead 
creators individually to reveal the value they attach to their right by renewing it, allowing it to 
lapse into the public domain when they no longer value it. Whilst this  would reintroduce 
formalities into the structure of copyright, technological advances may make these less of a 
burden than they were at the time of their abolition. Alternatively, one might consider an 
interpretation of equitable exceptions to copyright (such as fair use and fair dealing) so as to 
expand them gradually as the copyright in question ages. Such approaches would have the 
fortunate effect of avoiding that lobbying by the happy few needlessly locks up culture for 
most of us. 
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Over the past decade or so the term of copyright has been extended in 
many jurisdictions for authors who are individuals from life + 50 years to life + 70 
years. The term looks rather generous against the backdrop of the 14-year term 
granted in the first formal copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne, whose three-
hundredth anniversary we have just celebrated.
1 This invites a reflection upon 
what justifies the term of copyright and its recent extension.  
The term of copyright as seen in legal treatises 
Most  legal  treatises  on  copyright  barely  touch  upon  the  question  of  the 
duration of copyright. The Lucas brothers, in their well-known French treatise on 
copyright,
2  observe  that  "the  recent  extension  has  been  justified  by  the 
consideration that the ratio legis [of the term provision] was that the patrimonial 
rights should benefit two generations of heirs, an objective that the fifty year term 
[after the author's death] no longer allows to meet considering the increase in 
average life expectation."
3 They add that this postulate is really arbitrary and that 
the  recent  extension  may  also  be  due  to  significant  industry  pressure.  For 
Canada, Vaver deplores that as a result of the lengthy term of protection  "the 
public today pays for recycled work where it previously had cheaper or even free 
access" and sees as a contentious issue the question of "how far authors or their 
descendants benefit from the longer terms, eit her absolutely or relatively to 
distributors."
4 A major Dutch copyright treatise, by Spoor, Verkade and Visser, 
points out that of the two broad ways in which copyright is usually justified, that is 
personality and personal reward theories, on one side, and utilitarian theories, on 
the other, only the former could comfortably justify protection terms as long as 
                                            
1   Bently,  Lionel,  Uma  Suthersanen  and  Paul  Torremans  (eds),  Global  Copyright  -  Three 
Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace, Cheltenham, UK, 
Edward Elgar, 2010. The text of the Act is reproduced at pp. 501-506. 
2   Lucas, André and Henri-Jacques Lucas,  Traité de propriété littéraire & artistique, Paris, 
Litec, 2001, (2
nd ed.), n
o 431, p. 351. 
3   Lucas & Lucas 2001, id. "L'allongement a été justifié par l'idée que la  ratio legis était de 
faire bénéficier deux générations d'héritiers des droits patrimoniaux, objectif que Ie délai 
de cinquante ans ne permettait plus d'atteindre compte tenu de l'augmentation de la durée 
de vie moyenne (3). Au-delà du postulat, en vérité arbitraire (4), la solution était réclamée 
avec insistance par les exploitants." 
4   Vaver, David, Copyright Law, Toronto, Irwin Law, 2000, p. 100.     3 
we currently have.
5 They refer to a study  by two other Dutch authors, Teijl and 
Holzhauer, who conclude that the evidence in support of the thesis that copyright 
is beneficial to general economic welfare is not overwhelming.
6  
For Britain, Bently and Sherman
7 refer the reader to Ricketson's 1992 piece 
on the copyright term
8 and to the extensive public debate surrounding the 2003 
Eldred case before the US Supreme Court, as well as to the opinions of th e 
decision  itself.
9  Ricketson  voices  the  careful  opinion,  as  regards  how  long 
copyright  should  last,  that,  "[g]iven  our  uncertainty  about  the  reward  and 
incentive  functions  of  copyright  protection,  this  ca n  hardly  be  a  precise 
determination and any figure chosen will inevitably have an arbitrary feel about 
it"
10 and adds that "the grant of a long term of protection may play little, if any, 
role in the decisions that [publishers and other initial exploiters of works] make in 
the present."
11 A specialist of  the history of the Berne Convention, he  further 
observes that "the wider questions of policy have seldom come to the fore in 
debates over the term of protection within the Berne Union."
12  
The  Eldred-case  asked  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  to  consider 
whether federal legislation, the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act of 1998,  
designed retroactively and prospectively to extend the term of copyright  by an 
additional 20 years over that provided in the 1976 Cop yright Act was within the 
powers conferred upon Congress in  article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution, enabling it specifically "[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven tors the 
                                            
5   Spoor,  J.H.,  D.W.F.  Verkade  and  D.J.G.  Visser,  Auteursrecht,  naburige  rechten  en 
databankenrecht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2005, (3
rd ed.), §§ 13.1 and 13.2, referring to § 1.9. 
6   Id at 11, referring to  Teijl, R. and R.W. Holzhauer,  De toenemende complexiteit van het 
intellectuele eigendomsrecht - Een rechtseconomische analyse, Arnhem, Gouda Quint BV, 
1991,  at  p.  56.  This  view  is  shared  by  Ricketson,  Sam,  “New  Wine  into  Old  Bottles: 
Technological Change and Intellectual Property Rights”, (1992) 10 Prometheus 53-82, at 
p. 72, echoing p. 58: "[..] there is an absence of convincing empirical evidence on the 
success  or  otherwise  of  our  present  intellectual  property  laws  in  achieving  their  stated 
goals." 
7   Bently, Lionel et Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004, (2
nd ed.), p. 152. 
8   Ricketson,  Sam,  “The  Copyright  Term”,  (1992)  23  International  Review  of  Industrial 
Property and Copyright Law (IIC) 753-785. 
9   Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 123 SCt 769 (2003), 239 F.3d 372 (2003). 
10   Ricketson 1992 (Copyright Term), p. 761. 
11   Id. p. 766. 
12   Id. p. 783.     4 
exclusive  Right  to  their  respective  Writings  and  Discoveries."
13  In a divided 
decision (7 against 2) the court held that the Act was within the powers of 
Congress. In a strong dissenting opinion, Mr Justice Breyer felt that the term 
"limited times" should be read to "prohibit an indefinite and endless power to 
extend  existing  terms".   He  added  that  if  " [..]  somehow,  somewhere,  some 
potential author might be moved by the thought of great -grandchildren receiving 
copyright royalties a century hence, so  might some potential author also be 
moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two centuries, five centuries, 
1,000 years, " 'til the End of Time." And from a rational economic perspective the 
time difference among these periods makes no real differe nce. The present 
extension  will  produce  a  copyright  period  of  protection  that,  even  under 
conservative assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity 
(more than 99.99% for a songwriter like Irving Berlin and a song like Alexander's 
Ragtime Band)."
14 
Contributing to the debate from the United States, Reichman summarises 
the arguments advanced in favour of the current duration by observing that "the 
most generally accepted and least controversial is that an author should have 
the possibility of providing for himself during his own lifetime and then for his 
immediate dependents."
15 But this standard begs the question of whether works 
will in fact produce revenue throughout the copyright term. Even casual evidence 
suggests that this will not be  so for all but an exceedingly small number of very 
successful creations.  This in turn  suggests the reply that authors  wishing to 
provide  for  themselves  and  their  dependents  should  wisely  invest  moneys 
earned during the few years when the work is doing well in the market. They can 
then draw income from them for the rest of their lives and leave something as an 
inheritance. 
All of this might be petty squabbling if there were no costs to extending the 
term of copyright. But there are : whilst the copyright is in place, access to the 
work  is  costlier  than  it  would  otherwise   be  and  indeed  may  be  altogether 
impeded.  This  interferes  with  access  to  information  and  follow -on  creation. 
Almost all forms of human knowledge and cultural expression are cumulative, in 
                                            
13   http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A1Sec8.html . 
14   Eldred v. Ashcroft, op. cit., opinion of Breyer J. § I, C. 
15   Reichman, J.H., “The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy”, (1996) 14 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 625-654, at p. 643.      5 
the sense that innovations are made at the margin, building on or recombining 
existing content. Reducing access tends to slow the process of accretion, and 
hence the innovation flowing from it that drives the advancement of economic 
welfare. Surely this must be taken into consideration, even in the views seeking 
to justify copyright by personality theories. All rights reach their limit where they 
produce significant deleterious effects. 
And yet there clearly are creations that would not be forthcoming if those 
who can produce them were not spurred on by the prospect of reward for their 
efforts. IP is a decentralised instrument for producing such spurs. So there is a 
clear  policy  question  here  of  how  to  trade  off  principles  that  pull  in  opposite 
directions. To tackle such a policy question involves looking at the social effects 
of rules and of rule changes. Lawyers' tools do not equip them well to handle 
such matters. In this paper, we propose to turn to economics for an answer. 
What has economics got to say about the issue?
16 
The term of copyright – economic theory 
Economics looks at rules through the incentives they create for individuals 
to  prefer  certain  courses  of  action  over  others.  A  person  made  to  face  the 
prospect of liability in damages for negligent behaviour may react by being more 
careful. For any given rule, economics focuses on its foreseeable social effects. 
It  judges  rules  by  those  social  effects.  Copyright  holds  out  the  prospect  of 
revenue to the creators of copyright work. This prospect may draw them into 
creative  endeavour.  Creative  endeavour  feeds  into  innovation,  which  in  turn 
leads to improvement of economic welfare.  
The technique used in copyright to create the incentive effect for creative 
effort is to set up an individual right in an "information structure" embodied in the 
creation. This technique may be compared to others such as sponsoring creators 
or  providing  prizes.
17  Intellectual property rights borrow   some of the logic of 
                                            
16   The  ideas  presented  here  are  more  fully  developed  in  Mackaay,  Ejan  and  Stéphane 
Rousseau,  Analyse  économique  du  droit,  Paris/Montréal,  Dalloz-Sirey/Éditions  Thémis, 
2008, (2
nd ed.), pp. 264-325 and in the chapter on Intellectual Property in Ejan Mackaay, 
Economic  analysis  of  law  for  civilian  legal  systems,  Cheltenham,  UK,  Edward  Elgar 
(forthcoming). 
17   See for instance Gallini, Nancy T. and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is     6 
property rights in material objects. Property rights arise when an object becomes 
scarce  in  the  sense  that  it  can be  used for different,  incompatible  uses. The 
property right is one technique of solving the disputes or even conflicts that may 
arise  over  such  incompatible  uses.  It  has  the  virtue  of  being  entirely 
decentralised and incorporating an automatic feedback mechanism: the owner 
decides how to use the object and is informed on the quality of the choice made 
by the returns or losses flowing from such use. Where the right is transferable, a 
market for it may develop and this will tend to reinforce the feedback mechanism 
and move objects into the hands of those who make the most profitable use of 
them.
18 
But  there is a problem   with the transposition of property rights logic to 
information structures, as in intellectual property rights: unlike material objects, 
information is not naturally scarce; it can normally be used by multiple users  all 
at once without the original form losing its value. Often it can be reproduced at 
little  or  no  cost.  Furthermore,  m ost  creations  bu ild  on  earlier  creations: 
information "cumulates". All these "public goods" characteristics create problems 
for the creation of rights  and lead one to wonder whether  property rights  are 
desirable  at all and if so, how to ensure that their object can  effectively  be 
reserved to the titleholder. 
As regards the first question, whilst information itself is not naturally scarce 
in the economic sense of the term, human talent to create it may well be.  Where 
particular forms of creation are not a natural by -product  of ordinary human 
activity undertaken for other reasons, but require particular talents to be directed 
to producing them, there may be a point to setting up legal institutions that create 
special incentives to that effect. To put it differently, human talent is scarce and 
hence triggers the creation of forms of property   rights  to direct it to its most 
productive deployment.  
If we go for individual rights as incentive structures, we  face the challenge 
of  reserving  –  by  legal  fiat  –  the  informational  object  to  the  titleholder  –  a 
                                                                                                                                   
it the Best Incentive System?, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol 2, Adam Jaffe, 
Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern (eds), Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2002, pp. 51-78. 
18  See generally  Mackaay, Ejan and Stéphane R ousseau,  Analyse  économique  du  droit, 
Paris/Montréal,  Dalloz-Sirey/Éditions  Thémis,  2008,  (2
nd  ed.),  pp.  206-263  or  Ejan 
Mackaay, Economic analysis of law for civilian legal systems, Cheltenham, UK, Edward 
Elgar (forthcoming), chapter on Property rights.     7 
condition for any property right. To the extent that such reservation is successful, 
it  restricts  the  possibility  for  others  to  build  on  existing  works  for  follow-on 
creation and this tends to slow welfare growth. To judge a particular copyright 
regime one has to know the composite effect of these two opposite forces: that 
of stimulating creators whose creations are visible and that of restricting access 
for creators whose creations are yet to come. We should like to set this trade-off 
so as to maximise overall creativity in society in the longer run. As regards this 
trade-off, we are fairly confident that the relationship has the general shape of an 
inverted U-curve displayed in Diagram 1. 
Diagram 1 Relationship between the strength of intellectual property 





                                            
19   This  presentation  draws  on  Sag,  Matthew  J.,  “Beyond  Abstraction,  The  Law  and 
Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency”, (2006) 81 Tulane Law Review 
187-250, fig. 1 and 3, and on Valkonen, Sami J. and Lawrence J. White, “An Economic 
Model  for  the  Incentive/Access  Paradigm  of  Copyright  Propertization:  An  Argument  in 
Support  of  the  Proposed  New  §514  to  the  Copyright  Act”,  (2006)  29  Hastings 
Communications & Entertainment Law Journal 359-400.     8 
In  the  absence  of  formal  protection  of  intellectual  property,  interested 
persons  can  still  secure  their  creation  by  keeping  it  secret  and  insisting  on 
confidentiality agreements when giving access to it. So the left hand side of the 
graph  does  not  start  at  the  horizontal  axis.  When  formal  protection  is  weak, 
strengthening it should have the effect of improving overall creativity in society. 
Beyond  a  certain  point,  however,  strengthening  it  further  will  reduce  overall 
creativity as the monopolising effect of the rights crowds out follow-on innovation. 
Some empirical support for this inverted U-shape may be found in Lerner's 
survey  over  a  150-year  period,  admittedly  for  patents.
20  Lerner  uses  as 
dependent variable the number of patents taken out and relates this to the scope 
of the legislation protecting patents , as the explanatory variable . Where the 
protection is weak, legal changes strengthening it will lead to more patents being 
taken out (the left side of the curve in Diagram 1); where protection is already 
strong, further strengthening it will have little or no effect. 
Pollock attempts to estimate the optimal term of copyright by means of a 
formal model.
21 For parameters of copyright other than duration, one could take 
welfare to be indicated by the number of works created and make this depend on 
the stimulating effect of copyright, on one hand, and on its deadweight-loss effect 
(on follow-on creators) on the other. For the copyright term, a richer model is 
necessary which includes the consideration that copyright work produces welfare 
increases over time, but these increases decline  as  time  goes by  ("cultural 
decay"). By building in the cultural decay fac tor as well as a standard discount 
factor for the value of money earned in the future, Pollock is able to estimate an 
optimal copyright term of 15 years in a steady -state model.
 22 The estimate is, 
however, quite sensitive to the values of these parameters and putting them at 
the low end of the range, he arrives at an estimate of 52 years.
23 
Valuable  though  this  first  attempt  at  empirical  estimation  may  be,  we 
consider this in itself not yet conclusive as regard the optimal term of copyright. 
Hence, whilst  we  may feel confident that the relationship has the form of an 
                                            
20   Lerner, Josh, « 150 Years of Patent Protection », (2002) 92 American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings 221-225. 
21   Pollock,  Rufus,  «  Forever  Minus  a  Day?  Some  Theory  an d  Empirics  of  Optimal 
Copyright », (2009) 6 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 35-60. 
22   Id. p. 52. 
23   Ibid.     9 
inverted U, we do not know with confidence how to "measure the curve", and 
hence cannot yet ascertain in practice where the optimum lies. To illustrate what 
this means, consider Diagram 2. 
Diagram  2  Optimistic  and  pessimistic  views  of  the  relationship 
between the strength of intellectual property and the increase of general 
welfare (as mediated by the level of innovation) 
 
The grey curve (CN) is the same we used in Diagram 1. An optimistic view 
of current copyright (CO; the red curve) might hold that current protection is still 
below what would be optimal and hence that, if we are currently at E1, further 
strengthening  (moving from E1  to  E2, for instance) would  enhance  economic 
welfare.  It  appears  to  correspond  to  the  view  generally  taken  by  the  cultural 
industries. The opposite, pessimistic view (CP) is represented by the blue curve. 
It holds that at point E1, copyright is extended beyond what is socially optimal 
and  that  moving  from  E1  to  E2  would  reduce  overall  welfare.  By  contrast, 
tightening (moving to the left of E1) the criteria for eligibility for copyright (and 
hence  leaving  more  work  ineligible  for  it  and  in  the  public  domain)  would 
enhance economic welfare.     10 
We should now look at some observational evidence regarding the effects 
of copyright. 
The term of copyright – some empirics 
Scherer has done a remarkable study on the returns to innovation in the 
consumer market.  It  concerns  both  patents  (patents  in  general  and  those  on 
pharmaceutical products in particular) and copyright (with respect to music) in 
both  the  United  States  and  Germany.  Significantly,  the  study’s  name  is  “The 
Innovation  Lottery.”
24  In  all  fields,  the findings  seem  to  support  Schumpeter’s 
thesis  that,  owing  to  the  deep  uncertainty  involved  in  invention  and  its  low 
success rate, only exceptional profits would be able to encourage it. The profit 
should  be  much  greater  than  the  yield  that  attracts  persons  into  ordinary 
commercial ventures.
25  Scherer observes an  extremely  skewed distribution of 
profits: many participants earn very little and may even lose their shirt, whilst a 
minority hits the jackpot. In order to play in the lottery, one has to be risk -loving. 
These findings find support in Bessen’s more recent study.
26 
Commercial  exploitation  of  creations  is  normally  turned  over  to  major 
organisations (music, film and software publishers) the senior officers of which 
are anything but inveterate gamblers. Why do they participate in the innovation 
process? One must assume that they are able to spread the risk. They could 
shift part of the risk to other actors and put together a diversified project portfolio 
for the remainder, effectively pooling the risks. In an empirical study,
27 Baumol 
                                            
24   Scherer,  F.M.,  The  Innovation  Lottery,  in:  Expanding  the  Boundaries  of  Intellectual 
Property : Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman and Harry First (eds), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 3-
21. Kretschmer, Martin, Artists' Earnings and Copyright: A Review of British and German 
Music Data in the Context of Digital Technologies, in: New Directions in Copyright Law, 
Volume 2, Fiona Macmillan (ed.), Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2005, pp. 61-78, has 
similar findings for the music markets in Germany and Great Britain.  
25  Schumpeter  Schumpeter, Joseph A.,  Capitalism,  Socialism and Democracy, New  York, 
Harper & Row [1942], 1976, (5
th ed.), at pp. 73-74, cited by Scherer 2001, at p. 3.  
26   Bessen, James E.,  “The  Value  of  U.S.  Patents  by  Owner  and  Patent  Characteristics”, 
(2008) 37 Research Policy 932-945. 
27   Baumol, William J., Education for Innovation: Entrepreneurial Breakthroughs vs. Corporate 
Incremental Improvements,  in: innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 5, Adam B. 
Jaffe, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (eds), Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2005, pp. 33-56; 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10806.pdf .     11 
confirms this division of labour between inventors (often individuals or very small 
groups), who gamble on a small chance of winning the jackpot, and those, often 
large organisations, who take care of polishing and marketing, and who bet on 
the relative certainty of acceptable average profits across a broadly balanced 
portfolio  of  creations.  The  two  functions  are  complementary  and  not 
interchangeable. They both seem essential to bringing new products to market 
for  consumers.  For  our  purposes,  one  may  expect  copyright  works  that  still 
produce revenue towards the end of the term of protection to be in the hands of 
these large payers. 
Is an extended term helpful in counteracting the prospect of a very skewed 
lottery involving a "pot of gold?" Economists consider that the incentive effect 
today of future revenue diminishes with time. A dollar to be earned next year is 
discounted to the present and enters at its discounted value in decisions the 
beneficiary has to make now. As the number of years increases so does the 
discount factor, exponentially. Discounted to the present at a plausible rate, the 
current value of money to be earned 50 or more years from now is almost zero 
and hence so is its incentive effect.  
It would be interesting to go and see how creators themselves view the 
matter. This has been attempted by means of data on copyright renewals in the 
US  before  the  country  adhered  to  the  Berne  Convention  in  1989.  One  may 
presume holders who did not renew copyright at the end of the initial 28-year 
term to value it less at the time of renewal than the small renewal fee, that is 
almost  nothing.  Taken  over  all  copyright  holders,  non-renewals  allow  one  to 
extrapolate the useful life of copyright to the holders: the median value is about 
15 years according to a study by Landes and Posner.
28 Of course, this value 
hides enormous variation. For most creators, the value of copyright goes down to 
zero after only a few years. For the exceptional few ( such as the holders of the 
copyright in Mickey Mouse) it is valuable for as long as the right is valid.  This 
asymmetry may itself be part of the "pot of gold" logic driving copyright. 
                                            
28   Landes, William M. and Richard A. Posner, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright”, (2003) 70 
University of Chicago Law Review 471-518; reproduced in Landes, William M. and Richard 
A.  Posner,  The  Economic  Structure  of  Intellectual  Property  Law,  Cambridge,  Mass., 
Belknap of Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 210-253.     12 
The composite image resulting from these observations is that the current 
term  of  copyright  goes  very  much  beyond  the  needs  of  the  vast  majority  of 
creators. Only a minute fraction of them benefit from it; in most of these cases 
the copyright has been transferred into the hands of large-scale players that form 
the "cultural industries". 
What we do know is that over the past quarter century copyright has been 
extended in practice towards more protection on all of its registers: protectable 
objects, scope and duration of the right, sanctions available for infringement.
29 
Many  of  these  changes  clearly  benefit  the  large-scale  players  who  hold 
copyrights that still earn money. They operate at the scale required to engage in 
effective political lobbying. The legislative changes resulting from their efforts 
must be qualified as rent-seeking. Since copyright is uniform and automatically 
granted  to  all  creators,  th ese  changes  also  reinforce  the  rights  of   the  vast 
majority of copyright holders who don't need this and as a result lock  up much 
cultural expression needlessly. In this spirit, a recent study by a team of the IVIR-
Institute,  in  Amsterdam,  vehemently  opposes  a  term  extension  for  sound 
recordings.
30 
Where do we go from here 
What evidence we have suggests that the need for protection varies greatly 
amongst works subject to copyright and amongst their creators. At the extreme 
end of the distribution, fabulous revenues are earned, perhaps over the full term 
of copyright, and these may well be the "pots of gold" that prospectively entice 
creators  into  the  lottery  that  is  creative  effort,  where  at  the  other  end  of  the 
distribution  persons  earn  little, for a  short  time,  if  they  do  not  lose  their  shirt 
altogether. 
These realities are severely at odds with three of the principles on which 
copyright  is  essentially  founded  in  the  countries  of  the  Berne  Union. In  each 
country, copyright 
                                            
29   Nimmer,  David,  “Codifying  Copyright  Comprehensibly”,  (2004)  51  UCLA  Law  Review 
1233-1387 has examined in detail each of the amendments to US copyright legislation. 
30   Helberger, Natali, Nicole Dufft, Stef J. van Gompel and P. Bernt Hugenholt z,  “Never 
Forever:  Why  Extending  the  Term  of  Protection  for  Sound  Recordings  is  a  bad  Idea”, 
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- is essentially of uniform duration across products and copyright holders 
(save neighbouring rights) 
- is automatically obtained (no formality) 
- has a term of at least life + 50 years, for individual creators or 50 years 
after publication for films and anonymous work 
Perhaps time has come to question some or all of these principles. Given 
the extreme variation of the usefulness of copyright to the different holders and 
the difficulty we have in actually assessing that usefulness, one should like to 
see in place a system in which creators would be led to reveal what value they 
attach themselves to the copyright and protection would extend no further than 
the creator's expressed need for it.  
Revealing  one's  need  requires  an  act  by  the  creator  –  a  formality.  The 
drawbacks  of  formalities  have  been  amply  discussed  in  the  literature,  most 
recently in the Bently et al. reader on Global Copyright.
31 Whatever the historical 
experience,  van  Gompel  feels   that  technological  advances  have  made 
registration and consultation of the registers over the internet less of a burden 
than it would have been in the past, and advocates their reintroduction.
32 Looking 
back  at  the  long  US  experience  with  formalities  and  registration,  Ginsburg 
cautions  against  underestimating  the  difficulties  of  organising  a  smoothly 
functioning and quick registration system and even t he practicalities of obliging 
authors to affix a copyright notice.
33 But she admits that formalities have benefits: 
"If the creator cannot take care enough to mark off her claims, then perhaps the 
public should be entitled to rely on the absence of notice t o treat the work as 
unclaimed  and  free.  Law  and  economics  reasoning  might  reinforce  this 
conclusion: the creator is better able to assume the costs of notification than the 
                                            
31   Bently,  Lionel,  Uma  Suthersanen  and  Paul  Torremans  (eds),  Global  Copyright  -  Three 
Hundred Years Since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace, Cheltenham, UK, 
Edward Elgar, 2010, chapters 28 to 31, pp. 467-477. 
32   van Gompel, Stef, Formalities in the digital era: an obstacle or opportunity?,  in: Global 
Copyright: Three Hundred Years Since the Statute  of Anne, from 1709 to Cyberspace, 
Lionel  Bently,  Uma  Suthersanen  and  Paul  Torremans  (eds),  Cheltenham  UK,  Edward 
Elgar, 2010, pp. 395-424.  
33   Ginsburg, Jane C., The US Experience with Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship,  in: 
Global  Copyright:  Three  Hundred  Years  Since  the  Statute  of  Anne,  from  1709  to 
Cyberspace, Lionel Bently, Uma Suthersanen and Paul Torremans (eds), Cheltenham UK, 
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public  is  to  incur  the  costs  of  tracing  right  holders."
34  The real issue is what 
happens  in  case s  of  failure  to  affix  notice,  register  or  record  a  transfer  of 
ownership. 
What might a system look like that would preserve as much as possible of 
the current rules, yet  lead  creators to reveal the value they attach to their 
copyright and allow  copyright  to  be  maintained on highly valued work , whilst 
letting it lapse for the others, which would then slide into the public domain? One 
might grant copyright automatically upon creation for a limited time,  provided a 
notice is affixed indicating the year of creation and  identifying the right holder. 
Absence of such notice might be taken to be prima facie evidence of a desire to 
put the work in the public domain.  The right might be granted  initially  for 15 
years, on the basis of the numbers mentioned above.
35 At the expiry of this term, 
copyright  would  be  renewable  for  a  limited  time,  say  5  or  10  years,  upon 
registration  and  payment  of  a  fee  to  a  national  or  international  registration 
agency. Debatable points are whether copyright should be renewable indefinitely 
or for a limited number of times only, and whether the fee for renewal should be 
uniform or move up over time, as creators are apparently sensitive to the cost of 
renewal.
36 
One clear advantage of such a set-up would be that either the large players 
capable of mounting an effective lobbying effort will not need to do so (since they 
can renew their rights as they see fit)  or if they do, legislation to accommodate 
them will not spill over onto all copyright.  For follow-on creators – and aren’t we 
all – the uniform extension of the copyright term has the effect of needlessly 
locking up lots of culture that could circulate freely. This must count as a wasteful 
social  cost.  Admittedly  for  a  proposal  of  this  sort  to  go  forward,  the  Berne 
Convention will have to be reopened – a daunting international constraint on its 
chances of success.
37 Those leery of that prospect may ponder Justin Hughes' 
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36  Landes & Posner, 2003 Indefinitely, p. 33 and 2003 Economic Structure, p. 245. 
37   Hishinuma considers the possibility of revision of the Berne Treaty purely hypothetical: 
Hishinuma, Takeshi, The Scope of Formalities in International Copyright Law in a Digital 
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proposal, for the US, of an interpretation of copyright in which the scope of fair 
use expands as a work ages.
38 Equitable doctrines to similar effect in legislation 
and case law of other jurisdictions could be put to the same use
39. For Canada, 
for instance, the broad interpretation of the fair dealing provision in the Copyright 
Act the Supreme Court has adopted in the CCH-case leaves the door open to 
such a development, as a recent report by Boyer intimates
40. 
Conclusion 
Economics looks at copyright through the incentives it provides to entice 
creators into creative effort. It shows how copyright borrows some characteristics 
of  property  rights  generally,  but  parts  ways  with  them  to  accommodate  its 
particular objects, information structures, which unlike physical objects are not 
naturally  scarce.  It  points  to  the  negative  side  effect  of  copyright  in  that  it 
complicates access to the works subject to it. This should count as a cost in as 
much as new information structures build on existing ones: almost all information 
is "cumulative". It suggests that copyright, and indeed all intellectual property, is 
a compromise between the need for reward on creations we see by reserving 
them to the creator and the need to let information freely flow so as to permit 
further creations to emerge with as few encumbrances as possible.  
Over the past quarter century or so, all parameters of copyright have been 
moved towards more protection, disturbing the underlying compromise. The term 
of protection extends well beyond what is practically useful for the vast majority 
of creators, much as it may serve the needs of a small number of large players 
who  hold  important  older  copyrights  still  producing  revenue.  This  paradoxical 
situation results from a few founding principles considered untouchable in the 
countries members of the Berne Convention: it is automatically obtained, without 
formality and for a uniform and rather lengthy term. If we want to redress the 
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39   On this, see for instance  Geller, Paul  Edward, “A German Approach to Fair Use: Test 
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balance underlying copyright, we may have to call these principles into question 
and lead creators individually to reveal the value they attach to their right by 
renewing it, allowing it to lapse into the public domain when they no longer value 
it.  Whilst  this  would  reintroduce  formalities  into  the  structure  of  copyright, 
technological advances may make these less of a burden than they were at the 
time  of  their  abolition.  Such  an  approach  would  have  the  fortunate  effect  of 
avoiding that lobbying by the happy few needlessly locks up culture for most of 
us. 